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COPYRIGHT PROTECTION: A DEAD
FISH FOR SCULPTORS OF TAXIDERMY
MANNEQUINS?
INTRODUCTION
The Copyright Act of 1976 protects the property rights of creators
of "pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works."' In recent years two
cases have presented the federal courts with the issue of whether
sculptors of taxidermy mannequins are entitled to protection for
their creations under this statute. The question first arose before
a United States district court in Virginia in Superior Form Builders
v. Dan Chase Taxidermy Supply Co.2 The court held that the
mannequins were properly copyrightable as sculptural works, a
decision which was affirmed on appeal.3
In the second case, Hart v. Dan Chase Taxidermy Supply Co., a
New York district court held that while full-body animal manne-
quins and head and shoulder mannequins were copyrightable,
certain fish mannequins were barred from receiving copyright
protection by the merger doctrine.4 On appeal, the circuit court
vacated and remanded the case, instructing the trial court not to
consider the merger issue until it first heard evidence about
whether the competitor's mannequins were substantially similar to
those already copyrighted. 5 The trial court, following the direc-
'Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5) (1994).
'Superior Form Builders, Inc. v. Dan Chase Taxidermy Supply Co., 851 F. Supp. 222, 31
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1216 (E.D. Va. 1994). The mannequins at issue were two raccoons, a deer,
and an otter.
' Superior Form Builders, Inc. v. Dan Chase Taxidermy Supply Co., 74 F.3d 488, 37
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1571 (4th Cir. 1996).
'Hart v. Dan Chase Taxidermy Supply Co., 884 F. Supp. 71, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1846
(N.D.N.Y. 1995), vacated, 86 F.3d 320,39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1310 (2d Cir. 1996). Specifically,
the protected mannequins included: a standing bear, leopard, female mountain lion, sheep,
bobcat, coyote, buffalo/bison, black bear, woodchuck, raccoon, badger, elk, leaping deer, moose
head, sheep head, deer head "sneak" position, deer head turning left, deer head turning
toward shoulder, long-horn steer head, pronghorn antelope, deer head downward, and deer
head. The unprotected mannequins were three bass forms, two trout forms, a crappie/perch
form, and two bream/bluegill/sunfish forms. 884 F. Supp. at 76-77.
" Hart v. Dan Chase Taxidermy Supply Co., 86 F.3d 320, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1310 (2d
Cir. 1996).
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tions of the court of appeals on remand, still found that the fish
mannequins were not entitled to copyright protection.6 In both
cases, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant was using plaintiff's
mannequins to create its own forms.
In reaching their decisions, the courts which decided the Superior
Form Builders and Hart cases dealt with three issues bearing on
the ability to copyright taxidermy mannequins: originality, useful
articles, and the merger doctrine. This Note first examines these
three copyright issues and concludes that taxidermy mannequins
are properly copyrightable. Assuming that copyright protection
could be denied, however, another potential avenue of intellectual
property protection for taxidermy mannequins, namely, design
patents, will be analyzed.
I. COPYRIGHT PROTECTION
A. THE REQUIREMENT OF ORIGINALITY
Along with the quality of being fixed in a tangible medium of
expression, originality is one of the two fundamental qualities an
item must exhibit in order to receive copyright protection.7 In fact,
the United States Supreme Court has held that originality is not
only a requirement of the Copyright Act but is a constitutionally
mandated requirement.8 At this point, one should note that the
creativity required by copyright law is entirely distinct from
'Hart v. Dan Chase Taxidermy Supply Co., 967 F. Supp. 70, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1214
(N.D.N.Y. 1997), affd, 152 F.3d 918, (2d Cir. 1998 (full opinion available at 1998 WL
398812)).
' 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1994).8 Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1275, 1277 (1991):
The source of Congress' power to enact copyright laws is Article I, § 8, cl.
8, of the Constitution, which authorizes Congress to "securfel for limited
Times to Authors ... the exclusive right to their respective Writings."
.. [This Court defined the crucial terms "authors" and "writings." In
so doing, the Court made it unmistakably clear that these terms
presuppose a degree of originality.
(citing Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884); The Trade Mark Cases,
100 U.S. 82 (1879)).
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novelty, which is required to obtain a patent.9 What does originali-
ty mean for purposes of copyright law? Courts have construed the
word to have two distinct meanings. 10
The first definition of the originality requirement simply requires
that a work be independently created by the author, rather than
copied from other works." This element focuses on the actual
creation of the work. For example, in Hart, originality was
satisfied by the formation process because the sculptor indepen-
dently created details in the mannequin such as gesture, pose,
muscle structure, and skin wrinkles. 2
The second meaning of originality looks at a work's inherent
qualities and more specifically, what that work embodies in terms
of original thought. This note will refer to the second element of
originality as "substantive originality" because it focuses on the
quality of a work rather than the process of its creation. Substan-
tive originality has been subject to two dominant formulations. 3
One formulation is the "modicum of creativity" test, which
requires that a work exhibit at least some minimal degree of
creativity. 4 Although this formulation may sound like the initial
definition given for originality, it is distinct in that it focuses on the
9 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.01[A] (1998)
("Because originality is easier to establish than novelty, it follows that a copyright is less
vulnerable to an attack on its validity than is a patent. Conversely, however, the scope of
a copyright owner's protection is considerably more limited than that of a patent owner.").
10 Russ VerSteeg, Rethinking Originality, 34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 801, 805-06 (1993).
An interesting note is that the phrase "original works of authorship" was intentionally left
undefined in order to incorporate the standards which had developed in the common law.
Notes of Committee on the Judiciary, H.R. REP. No. 94-1476 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659.
" Feist Publications, Inc., 499 U.S. at 345. There only appears to be one exception to this
requirement. In the so-called "Hand of God" case, Alva Studios, Inc. v. Winninger, 177 F.
Supp. 265, 123 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 487 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), an exact scale artistic reproduction of
a highly complicated statue made with great precision was deemed original as requiring
"great skill and originality." L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 490 n.3, 189
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 753, 756 n.3 (2d Cir. 1976).
12 Hart v. Dan Chase Taxidermy Supply Co., 884 F. Supp. 71, 77 (N.D.N.Y. 1995).
13 VerSteeg, supra note 10, at 807.
14 Feist Publications, Inc., 499 U.S. at 345 (citing MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER,
1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.01[A]-[B] (1990)). The rules of the Copyright Office do not
require a creativity element; the element has been entirely judicially created. Mitzi S.
Phalen, Comment, How Much is Enough? The Search for a Standard of Creativity in Works
of Authorship Under Section 102(a) of the Copyright Act of 1976, 68 NEB. L. REV. 835, 837
(1989).
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inherent quality of the work itself, without consideration of the
creator's efforts. While the first definition of originality would
require that the creator actually exert a sufficient degree of
creativity, the modicum of creativity test simply looks at whether
a sufficient degree of creativity inheres from an objective stand-
point in the work itself.
In Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., the
Court applied this standard and stated that "[tihere remains a
narrow category of works in which the creative spark is utterly
lacking or so trivial as to be virtually nonexistent.""5 At issue in
Feist were rival telephone directories. The plaintiff, a telephone
utility company, alleged that it was entitled to copyright protection
for the list of names and numbers which comprised the directory
and that the defendant had infringed these rights by publishing a
similar directory. The Court denied copyright protection to the
telephone directories at issue in that case, describing the works as
mechanical, garden-variety, and typical.' 6 Although the works in
Feist failed the modicum of creativity test, by definition the test
generally provides a low threshold" and in most cases will
probably not bar copyright protection.
The second major formulation of substantive originality can be
categorized as the "trivial/distinguishable variation" test. Under
this standard, a work must exhibit a distinguishable variation,
meaning that the author's contribution must be something which
is not merely trivial-something recognizably his own." This test
recognizes that even a copy of something in the public domain will
support a copyright if it is a distinguishable variation. 9 Like the
modicum of creativity test, the threshold for copyright protection
under this test is seemingly fairly low.2 °
15 Feist Publications, Inc., 499 U.S. at 359.
16 Id. at 362.
17 The word modicum is defined as "a small portion" or "a limited quantity or amount."
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1452 (1966).
" Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 102-03, 90 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
153, 155-56 (2d Cir. 1951).
" Kamar Int'l, Inc. v. Russ Berrie & Co., 657 F.2d 1059, 1061, 216 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 376,
378 (9th Cir. 1981).
' See, e.g., id. (holding that copyright protection was available to toy stuffed animals due
to toy producer's variation of matter already in public domain); C & F Enters., Inc. v.
Barringtons, Inc., 43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1607 (E.D. Va. 1997) (holding that needlepoint
adaptations of existing works satisfied the originality requirement by simply translating the
works into a different medium). But see Entertainment Research Group, Inc. v. Genesis
162 [Vol. 6:159
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Any difference between the modicum of creativity test and the
trivial/distinguishable variation standard appears to be slight. The
modicum of creativity test is a quantitative standard-a court will
look at the amount of creativity which exists in a work for which
copyright protection is sought and make a finding as to whether
that amount is sufficient. In contrast, the trivial/distinguishable
variation standard is a qualitative test. A court will look at
whether the inherent features of a work represent a distinguishable
variation from similar works already in existence. Whether or not
this apparent difference between quantity and quality actually has
any practical significance is debatable. The question whether a
variation is distinguishable, like the inquiry into the amount which
constitutes a modicum of creativity, is unclear; so courts seemingly
have quite a bit of discretion in applying either standard. Since a
bright line rule does not exist, analogy to existing case law is
perhaps the only way to determine whether or not a work can
satisfy the originality requirement.
Having established the bases and formulations of the originality
requirement, the next question to be addressed is whether the
mannequins at issue in Superior Form Builders and Hart satisfy
that requirement. The district court in Superior Form Builders did
not deal with the issue directly, but the court of appeals held that
the mannequins were original works for purposes of the Copyright
Act.2' Although the court explicitly adopted the modicum of
creativity test elaborated in Feist, its decision would likely be
correct under either of the prevailing standards of substantive
originality.
First, under the modicum of creativity test, the mannequins do
indeed possess the requisite amount of artistry. The way in which
the court described the process of creating the mannequins
indicates that each mannequin was bestowed with a significant
degree of creativity by the mannequins' sculptors:
Creative Group, Inc., 122 F.3d 1211, 1223, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705, 1714 (9th Cir. 1997)
(holding that three dimensional inflatable costumes based on two-dimensional cartoon
characters represent only a trivial variation).
21 Superior Form Builders, Inc. v. Dan Chase Taxidermy Supply Co., 74 F.3d 488, 493,
37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1571, 1575 (4th Cir. 1996).
1998]
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Knight creates the mannequins, using casts of actual
animal carcasses as models. He begins by applying
clay to an armature made of wood and actual animal
bones and shaping the desired animal in a particular
pose and with precise anatomical features. From the
clay sculpture, he makes a fiberglass mold and uses
it to produce polyurethane forms, i.e. the animal
mannequins. The mannequins contain special
receptacles for artificial eyes, "ear butts" for the
proper placement of animal ears, and pre-molded
features for the application of artificial teeth.22
Recall that the threshold for protection under the modicum of
creativity standard is quite low. Thus, the amount of creativity
used by sculptors of taxidermy mannequins is more than sufficient
to bring their creations within the scope of the Copyright Act.
The holding in Superior Form Builders also accords with the
trivial/distinguishable variation standard. Even though a taxider-
my mannequin may be limited to a certain degree by the natural
features of the animal on which it is based, an animal sculpture,
even if realistic, is copyrightable as long as the work represents the
author's creative effort.23 Moreover, the fact that a sculpture is
based on the same live animal on which others are based does not
prevent the sculptor from receiving copyright protection for his own
efforts: "Several sculptors may copy a deer, even the same deer, in
creating a sculpture, and each may obtain copyright protection for
his or her own expression of the original."24 The sculptors of
taxidermy mannequins in Superior Form Builders exercised a
sufficient degree of creativity by choosing the pose of the manne-
quin, including muscular and skin detail, thus contributing a
distinguishable variation to the actual animal on which their works
were based. Therefore, the decision of the court that the manne-
quins met the originality requirement would be proper under the
trivial/distinguishable variation test.
22 Id. at 491.
2 Kamar Int'l, Inc., 657 F.2d at 1061.
' Superior Form Builders, Inc., 74 F.3d at 492 (citing Rachel v. Banana Republic, Inc.,
831 F.2d 1503, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1877 (9th Cir. 1987)).
164 [Vol. 6:159
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None of the courts in Hart directly addressed the originality
issue, because like in Superior Form Builders, it was not actually
in controversy. The forms in Hart were similar to those in Superior
Form Builders, however, so the reasoning of the Fourth Circuit
would apply, and these mannequins would also satisfy the originali-
ty requirement under either the modicum of creativity or trivial/
distinguishable variation standards.
B. USEFUL ARTICLES
The second issue bearing on the availability of copyright
protection for taxidermy mannequins is Whether the mannequins
are useful articles. The Copyright Act clearly mandates that
copyright protection extends only to expression in the copyrighted
work and not to any facts or useful aspects of the work." The
statute defines a useful article as "an article having an intrinsic
utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the appearance of
the article or to convey information."26 Moreover, a work of
authorship which is embodied in a useful article will only be given
protection by the Copyright Act if "[the] design incorporates
pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified
separately from, and are capable of existing independently of, the
utilitarian aspects of the article."27 The requirement of indepen-
dence of utilitarian and aesthetic features has produced two legal
doctrines: physical separability and conceptual separability.
The seminal case dealing with the physical separability of
expression and utility is Mazer v. Stein.2" In Mazer, the United
States Supreme Court held that statuettes decorating the base of
a lamp were entitled to copyright protection because the figures,
otherwise copyrightable, could be physically removed leaving all
functional aspects of the lamp unaffected. 29 The Court premised
this result on the policies underlying the Copyright Act and on the
historical practice of the Copyright Office of issuing copyrights for
"Terrence J. Carroll, Protection for Typeface Designs: A Copyright Proposal, 10 SANTA
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 139, 149 (1994).
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
271d.
28 Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 100 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 325 (1954).
29 Id. at 212-13.
19981
7
Rogers: Copyright Protection: A Dead Fish for Sculptors of Taxidermy Mann
Published by Digital Commons @ Georgia Law, 1998
J. INTELL. PROP. L.
items like those in Mazer.3" The concept of physical separability
presents a fairly straightforward test for determining whether a
work is a useful article outside the scope of Copyright Act protec-
tion. If the functional and artistic features cannot be tangibly
separated, copyright protection will not ensue.
The second major (and more modem) standard that has been
applied to useful article questions is conceptual separability. The
language of the copyright statute does not distinguish between
physical and conceptual separability, but Congress decided to
respond to the Mazer decision by clarifying its intentions.'
Congress explicitly annotated the statute by stating that copyright
protection will be given to an item whose artistic elements,
"physically or conceptually, can be identified as separable from the
utilitarian aspects of that article."32
One of the most important cases to apply the conceptual
separability test is Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc.,
which dealt with the availability of copyright protection for
ornamental belt buckles.33 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals
held that the buckles had a separate ornamental use and that the
utilitarian function was "subsidiary" to the primary ornamental
aspect, thus the buckles were properly copyrightable.34 Even
though the aesthetic and functional features of the belt buckles
were physically inseparable, the buckles could be copyrighted
because these features could conceivably be distinguished.
Within the category of conceptual separability, several modem
tests have developed to determine whether ornamental and
utilitarian features can indeed be separated. Two of these tests
derive from Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp., a case
involving mannequins of human torsos used to display clothing. 5
The design of these mannequins was distinctively different from the
30 Id. at 211-12.
"' Gary S. Raskin, Comment, Copyright Protection for Useful Articles: Can the Design of
an Object be Conceptually Separated from the Object's Function?, 33 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
171, 178-79 (1993).
2Id. at 179 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 94-1476 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659).
"3 Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989, 208 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1 (2d
Cir. 1980).
' Id. at 993.
' Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 228 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 385
(2d Cir. 1985).
166 [Vol. 6:159
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traditional full-figured mannequins that were used at the time.
The difficult issue in the case was that the design itself was the
object for which copyright protection was being sought.36 The
court held that copyright protection was not available to the
mannequins based on the useful articles doctrine.3"
The court distinguished Kieselstein-Cord because in that case, the
ornamental surfaces of the belt buckles were in no way required by
their utilitarian functions, whereas the design of the mannequins
in Carol Barnhart was entirely dictated by utility.38 The fact that
led the court to deny copyright protection for the mannequins was
that the utilitarian and artistic aspects of the mannequins were
"inextricably intertwined."39 The court suggested that perhaps a
more appropriate line of protection for the mannequins' sculptor to
pursue would have been to obtain a design patent, an alternative
form of protection which will be dealt with in detail later.
In dissent, Judge Newman proposed a "displacement test." He
asserted that the artistic features of a useful article are separable
when the article stimulates in the ordinary observer a concept that
is independent from the article's utilitarian concept.40  Thus,
Judge Newman's test is an entirely objective one, relying on the
reaction of an ordinary observer to the work for which copyright
protection is sought. According to Judge Newman, use of an
ordinary observer standard is consistent with standards in other
3 Raskin, supra note 31, at 189.
37 Carol Barnhart Inc., 773 F.2d at 418.
38 The features of the mannequins were dictated solely by the utilitarian purpose of
displaying clothing. Id. at 419.
39 id.
'0 Judge Newman provided the example of an artistically designed chair displayed in a
museum:
The ordinary observer can be expected to apprehend the design of a chair
whenever the object is viewed. He may, in addition, entertain the
concept of a work of art, but, if this second concept is engendered in the
observer's mind simultaneously with the concept of the article's
utilitarian function, the requisite "separateness" does not exist. The test
is not whether the observer fails to recognize the object as a chair but
only whether the concept of the utilitarian function can be displaced in
the mind by some other concept.
Id. at 422 (Newman, J. dissenting). In the case of taxidermy mannequins, however, the
ordinary observer would probably fail to recognize the underlying mannequin and would see
only the aesthetic elements of the animal, because most people probably do not have an
understanding of exactly how the taxidermy process works.
1998]
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areas of copyright law, such as "whether an allegedly infringing
work bears a substantial similarity to a copyrighted work."4'
Applying his standard to the mannequins in Carol Barnhart, Judge
Newman argued:
[A reasonable observer of the mannequins] would be
most unlikely even to entertain, from visual inspec-
tion alone, the concept of a mannequin with the
utilitarian function of displaying a shirt or a blouse.
The initial concept in the observer's mind, I believe,
would be of an art object, an entirely understandable
mental impression based on previous viewing of
unclad torsos displayed as artistic sculptures."
Thus, according to Judge Newman, the experience of the ordinary
observer in viewing human torsos as art would qualify the manne-
quins for copyright protection.
Another standard has been proposed by Professor Nimmer.
Nimmer argues that "conceptual separability exists where there is
any substantial likelihood that even if the article had no utilitarian
use it would still be marketable to some significant segment of the
community simply because of its aesthetic qualities."43 Nimmer's
standard is like that proposed by Judge Newman in that it is
largely objective, relying on whether a certain portion of the
community would find a work marketable based exclusively on
aesthetic features. Applying Nimmer's test to the articles at issue
in Carol Barnhart, the question would be whether the torso
mannequins would be marketable if they possessed no usefulness
for the Oisplay of clothing. Because the mannequins are probably
not marketable solely for their aesthetic qualities, they would be
denied copyright protection under Nimmer's test. Nimmer points
out, however, that his standard suffers from three primary
weaknesses: it may tend to favor more conventional forms of art,
may be difficult to prove, and may be too restrictive of copyright
41 Carol Barnhart Inc., 773 F.2d at 422.
42 Id. at 424.
4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 9, § 2.08[B][3]. Nimmer's test for conceptual
separability is very similar to the matter of concern doctrine, which will be discussed later
under the topic of design patents.
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protection."
The test for conceptual separability which has perhaps received
the most attention in the federal courts is that initially proposed by
Professor Denicola. The Denicola test inquires which aspects of the
work are dictated by the functional constraints of the article and
which aspects reflect the unconstrained perspective of the artist.45
Denicola's standard was adopted by the court in Brandir Interna-
tional, Inc. v. Cascade Pacific Lumber Co., which stated the test as
follows: "[Wihere design elements can be identified as reflecting
the designer's artistic judgment exercised independently of
functional influences, conceptual separability exists."46 Thus, the
Denicola test focuses on the relationship between the final work
and the process by which it came to fruition, with emphasis on the
exercise of discretion by the designer.47
Brandir International involved the issue of whether copyright
protection was available for the design of a bicycle rack. The
manufacturer of the racks argued that the design stemmed from
wire sculptures that he had created as a means of personal
expression.48 The court rejected this argument, holding that
although these original sculptures may have been copyrightable,
the final product was not, because its function could not be
distinguished from any artistic expression which the racks
embodied.49 In other words, by looking at the finished product,
the court could not identify any artistic quality of the design that
existed separately from function.
With the foregoing principles relating to useful articles as a basis
for discussion, this Note now turns to the question of how the
useful article issue was dealt with in the taxidermy mannequin
cases. In Superior Form Builders, the district court did not utilize
any of the common law tests relating to useful articles. Instead,
the court looked solely at the language of the Copyright Act,
4Id.
45 Robert C. Denicola, Applied Art and Industrial Design: A Suggested Approach to
Copyright in Useful Articles, 67 MINN. L. REV. 707, 742 (1983).
46 Brandir Intl, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1145, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1089, 1092 (2d Cir. 1987).
47 Raskin, supra note 31, at 193.
48 Brandir Int'l, Inc., 834 F.2d at 1146.
49 Id. at 1147.
1998] 169
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reasoning that since the usefulness of the taxidermy forms was
their portrayal of the appearance of animals, the forms by defini-
tion were not useful articles.5" On appeal, the issue was ad-
dressed in more detail. The circuit court explicitly followed the
Denicola test as set out in Brandir International to reach the
conclusion that the artistic elements of the mannequins were
conceptually separable from their function.5'
In Hart, the district court also utilized the Denicola test and
concluded that the artistic and functional elements of the manne-
quins were separable and rejected the argument that copyright
protection should be denied on useful article grounds.52 On
appeal, the court did not deal with the issue of separability but
found that the mannequins were copyrightable based on reasoning
similar to that used by the district court in Superior Form Build-
ers.53 Specifically, the court concluded that "the function of the
... form is to portray its own appearance, and that fact is enough
to bring it within the scope of the Copyright Act."54
Both Hart and Superior Form Builders distinguished the
taxidermy mannequins from the human mannequins at issue in
Carol Barnhart. In Hart, the defendant, Dan Chase Taxidermy
Supply, based its useful article argument on Carol Barnhart.
Chase argued that the fish mannequins at issue in Hart served the
same purpose as the mannequins in Carol Barnhart and that in
both cases, "the 'display' function dictates the shape of the manne-
quin." " The court distinguished the two cases, however, stating
that while the torsos in Carol Barnhart were "little more than
o Superior Form Builders, Inc. v. Dan Chase Taxidermy Supply Co., 851 F. Supp. 222,
223, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1216, 1217 (E.D. Va. 1994). Useful articles under the Copyright
Act are those having a utilitarian function that is "not merely to portray the appearance of
the article... ." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994). See also Masquerade Novelty, Inc. v. Unique Indus.,
Inc., 912 F.2d 663, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1881 (3d Cir. 1990) (finding that a nose mask for
people based on the appearance of an animal was copyrightable because its sole function was
to portray the appearance of the article).
"1 Superior Form Builders, Inc. v. Dan Chase Taxidermy Supply Co., 74 F.3d 488, 494,
37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1571, 1575 (4th Cir. 1996).
8 Hart v. Dan Chase Taxidermy Supply Co., 884 F. Supp. 71, 74, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1846, 1849 (N.D.N.Y. 1995), vacated, 86 F.3d 320, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1310 (2d Cir. 1996).
" Hart v. Dan Chase Taxidermy Supply Co., 86 F.3d 320,323,39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1310,
1312 (2d Cir. 1996).
5I4 d.
5 Id.
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glorified coat-racks used to display clothing in stores," the "shape,
volume, and movement of the animal" in Hart were "depicted by
the underlying mannequin."56 Thus, the court apparently recog-
nized a significant amount of artistic expression in the taxidermy
mannequins beyond any functional considerations, an acknowledge-
ment which the Carol Barnhart majority was unwilling to make.
Alternately stated, in terms of the standard used by the majority
in Carol Barnhart, the aesthetic and utilitarian elements of the
taxidermy forms were not inextricably intertwined.
In Superior Form Builders, Carol Barnhart was distinguished in
a similar manner. The court reasoned that the utilitarian aspects
of taxidermy mannequins exist only to represent the appearance of
the animal, whereas the utility of the human mannequins in Carol
Barnhart bore no relation to the appearance of the mannequin
itself but was instead solely concerned with the display of cloth-
ing.5" The issue may have been more complex had it been decided
under Judge Newman's objective standard. Under Newman's test,
the outcome would depend on whether the taxidermy mannequins
stimulated a concept other than utility in an ordinary observer.5"
Specifically stated, the question would be whether an ordinary
observer could mentally displace the utility of the taxidermy forms
with some other concept relative to aesthetic quality. The taxider-
my mannequins would likely pass this test, because an ordinary
observer would either only recognize the nature of the portrayal of
the animal (invoking the definition of the Copyright Act) or be able
to distinguish that portrayal from the form's utility (satisfying
conceptual separability). A possible outcome under the displace-
ment test, however, could be that the forms would be seen as
objects simply used to "stuff" animals with no other recognizable
artistic qualities. If the displacement test were to become a
majority rule, the question of whether taxidermy mannequins are
useful articles could become muddied.
Nimmer's test could likewise make the issue more complicated.
Recall that Nimmer's standard, also an objective one, asks whether
56id.
'
7 Superior Form Builders, Inc., 74 F.3d at 493-94.Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 422 (2d Cir. 1985)
(Newman, J. dissenting).
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the item in question would be marketable to some segment of the
community based on its non-utilitarian features.59 The question
thus becomes whether the taxidermy forms would be marketable if
they were useless for mounting animal skins. This question could
very well be answered in the negative. The taxidermy forms are
simply skeletal structures made from wood, clay, and bone, and
their aesthetic features may not sufficiently support their market-
ability. Such a finding would accord with Nimmer's own critique
of his standard that it favors more conventional forms of art.6'
Because of such weaknesses, Nimmer's test will likely not obtain
the frequency of usage that the Denicola test has obtained.
Sculptors of taxidermy forms can probably survive useful articles
challenges for the moment, since the Denicola test (perhaps the
most liberal of the conceptual separability tests) continues to be the
most frequently applied standard. However, these sculptors still
must circumvent a third possible obstacle to copyright protection:
the merger doctrine.
C. THE MERGER DOCTRINE
The third and final issue bearing on the availability of copyright
protection for taxidermy mannequins is the merger doctrine. The
merger doctrine holds that an "expression is not protected in those
instances where there is only one or so few ways of expressing an
idea that protection of the expression would effectively accord
protection to the idea itself."6' In other words, when there are
only a few ways of expressing an idea, the expression merges with
the idea, making the expression non-copyrightable. This common
law doctrine is intended to effectuate the mandate of the Copyright
Act that copyright protection shall not extend to any idea. 2 In
this way, the merger doctrine "prevent[s] an author from monopo-
59 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 9, § 2.08[B][3].
60 Supra note 43 and accompanying text.
61 Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 705, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161, 1164 (2d Cir.
1991).
62 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994).
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lizing an idea merely by copyrighting a few expressions of it."63
Before looking at the substantive standards of the merger
doctrine, a preliminary procedural issue must be examined. At
what point during trial should the merger doctrine be considered?
The courts have not reached a consensus as to when the merger
doctrine should be applied during the course of copyright litigation.
Some courts consider the merger doctrine as a defense to the
infringement claim, while others treat merger as a fundamental
matter bearing on whether the work is copyrightable at all.'
Nimmer's treatise regards application of the merger doctrine in the
infringement defense context as the better view.65
The courts that decided the Hart case struggled with the choice
of which standard to apply. The district court initially dealt with
merger in the context of copyrightability.66 However, the court of
appeals vacated this decision and instructed the district court on
remand to consider the merger doctrine as a defense to infringe-
ment.67 The rationale for this decision will be discussed later.
Turning to the substance of the merger doctrine, no bright line
rule seems to exist instructing how many forms of expression are
enough to avoid a finding of merger between expression and idea.
Thus, one must attempt to glean a standard from the case law.
One of the more important cases which recently applied the merger
doctrine is Kregos v. Associated Press. Kregos involved a baseball
pitching form in which the author selected nine criteria for
evaluating pitching performances.' The court applied the merger
6' Hart v. Dan Chase Taxidermy Supply Co., 884 F. Supp. 71, 76, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1846, 1850 (N.D.N.Y. 1995), vacated, 86 F.3d 320, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1310 (2d Cir. 1996)
(quoting Toro Co. v. R & R Prods. Co., 787 F.2d 1208, 1212, 229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 282, 284
(8th Cir. 1986)).
6Hart, 884 F. Supp. at 76.
6MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03[B] [3] (1997)
(arguing that "the inseparability of idea and expression [should be viewed] in the context of
a particular dispute, rather than attempting to disqualify certain expressions from protection
per se").
"Hart, 884 F. Supp. at 76.
67 Hart v. Dan Chase Taxidermy Supply Co., 86 F.3d 320, 322-23, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1310, 1312 (2d Cir. 1996).
"Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 702, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161, 1162 (2d Cir.
1991) ("The first category in Kregos' 1983 form, performance during the entire season,
comprises two items-won/lost record (1) and earned run average (2). The second category,
performance during the entire season against the opposing team at the site of the game
19981 173
15
Rogers: Copyright Protection: A Dead Fish for Sculptors of Taxidermy Mann
Published by Digital Commons @ Georgia Law, 1998
J. INTELL. PROP. L.
doctrine in the context of infringement 69 and held that the pitch-
ing forms were protected and were not subject to the doctrine of
merger. 70  The test to which the Kregos court put the pitching
forms was stated as follows: "[Ihf the idea is formulated at a level
of abstraction above the particular selection of facts the compiler
has made, then merger of idea and expression is not automatic."7'
The court further refined this standard, stating, "[als long as
selections of facts involve matters of taste and personal opinion,
there is no serious risk that withholding the merger doctrine will
extend protection to an idea."72 Because Kregos exercised a
significant amount of discretion in choosing his nine specific criteria
out of the vast number of possible statistics that could be used to
evaluate pitchers, his work was protected. An important policy
endorsed by the court in Kregos was that the merger doctrine
should be applied with caution.7'
In Mason v. Montgomery Data, Inc., the court explicitly adopted
a more policy-oriented approach, stating that the guiding consider-
ation in drawing the line between idea and expression should be
preservation of "the balance between competition and protection
reflected in the patent and copyright laws."74 The court stated
that the first step in the merger analysis is identifying the idea and
that application of tile merger doctrine will often depend on how
this idea is defined.7' The works at issue in Mason were maps of
real estate parcels made by overlaying realty information on top of
comprises three items-won/lost record (3), innings pitched (4), and earned run average (5).
The third category, performance in the last three starts, comprises four items-won/lost
record (6), innings pitched (7), earned run average (8), and men on base average (9). This
last item is the average total of hits and walks given up by a pitcher per nine innings of
pitching.").
69 Id. at 705.
70 Id. at 707.
" Id. at 706.72 Id. at 707.
73 Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700,705, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161, 1163 (2d Cir.
1991) ("Determining when the idea and its expression have merged is a task requiring
considerable care: if the merger doctrine is applied too readily, arguably available alterna-
tive forms of expression will be precluded; if applied too sparingly, protection will be accorded
to ideas.").
71 Mason v. Montgomery Data, Inc., 967 F.2d 135, 140, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1676, 1681
(5th Cir. 1992) (quoting Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742,
170 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 557, 559 (9th Cir. 1971)).
75 Mason, 967 F.2d at 140.
174 [Vol. 6:159
16
Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 6, Iss. 1 [1998], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol6/iss1/6
COPYRIGHT PROTECTION
existing topographical maps published by the United States
Geological Survey."6 The court held that because different map-
makers with the same idea could reach different conclusions by
relying on different sources, merger did not occur:
Although Mason sought to depict the information
accurately, the conflicts among the sources and the
limitations inherent in the process of representing
reality in pictorial map form required him to make
choices that resulted in independent expression.
Extending protection to that expression will not
grant Mason a monopoly over the idea, because other
mapmakers can express the same idea differently.77
This holding accords with the holding of Kregos, again recognizing
the author's discretion as a key component in determining whether
a work is copyrightable.
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit applied
the merger doctrine in the infringement context, based on a
substantial similarity test, and held that in order to determine
whether there are various forms of expression available to an idea
the court must look at the similarities between existing expres-
sions." If existing expression of an idea does not demonstrate a
sufficient degree of variety, copyright protection will be denied. 9
Like Judge Newman's objective test for useful articles, this inquiry
is based on whether similarity would be recognized by the ordinary
observer."0
In Concrete Machinery Co. v. Classic Lawn Ornaments, Inc., the
court applied this standard to concrete lawn ornaments. The court
held that there was no merger of expression and idea because the
76 Id. at 136.
7 Id. at 140.
78 Concrete Mach. Co. v. Classic Lawn Ornaments, Inc., 843 F.2d 600, 607, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1357, 1363 (1st Cir. 1988).
79 Id.
8 Id. In an infringement suit, the plaintiff must "demonstrate that the works are
substantially similar in both idea and expression." Rachel v. Banana Republic, Inc., 831 F.2d
1503, 1507,4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1877, 1881 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting Frybarger v. Internation-
al Bus. Machs. Corp., 812 F.2d 525,529, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1135, 1137-38 (9th Cir. 1987)).
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different statues introduced at trial contained "a considerable
amount of detail, representing one of several ways of expressing
each underlying concept."8' Thus, because the forms of expression
presented as evidence to the court were sufficient in variety, the
merger doctrine did not apply.
Turning to the taxidermy mannequin cases, recall that the
merger doctrine was only prohibitive of copyright protection with
respect to the forms used to mount fish in Hart. The merger
doctrine never arose in Superior Form Builders because that case
only involved forms of mammals. Either the defendant in that case
did not argue the merger doctrine as a reason for invalidating
Superior Form Builders' copyright, or the court simply did not feel
that the merger doctrine was sufficiently at issue to warrant
discussion in the opinion.
In Hart, however, the district court's determination regarding the
initial issue of copyrightability was that there was "no meaningful
detail in the mannequins that is not commanded by the idea of a
realistic fish."" The court stated that the mannequins were no
more than the body of a fish and that because of their lack of
detail, only a limited amount of expression was present.83
The court of appeals remanded the case to the trial court,
instructing the court to deal with the merger issue in the infringe-
" Concrete Mach. Co., 843 F.2d at 609. The court provided the following analysis, which
is useful in the context of taxidermy mannequins:
As an example in the case before us, appellant has a copyright in the
design of concrete "life size deer." The idea behind this particular
expression can be briefly described as a "realistic-looking concrete deer."
Appellant cannot prohibit others from appropriating this idea; it can,
however, prohibit any actual copying of its own version of a "realistic-
looking concrete deer." Yet, it has a problem of proof: because the statue
is a detailed replica of a real deer, the deer, in essence, supplied most of
the features which any subsequent artist can also take from the real
deer. To prove copying then, Concrete must show substantial similarity,
between works, in those features over which it exercised discretion while
portraying a "realistic-looking concrete deer." These features include
such aspects as pose, posture, and facial expression.
843 F.2d at 607.
' Hart v. Dan Chase Taxidermy Supply Co., 884 F. Supp. 71, 76, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1846, 1850 (N.D.N.Y. 1995), vacated, 86 F.3d 320, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1310 (2d Cir. 1996).
" Hart, 884 F. Supp. at 77.
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ment context based on a substantial similarity standard.' The
rationale for this decision was that a court will normally have a
more detailed and realistic basis for evaluating the relationship
between idea and expression if it has all forms of expression before
it.85 On remand, the district court followed the circuit court's
instructions and held that substantial similarity between all fish
forms before the court justified imposition of the merger doc-
trine.86 Because of limitations in expression, idea and expression
merged, barring copyright protection.
Summarizing the availability of copyright protection for taxider-
my forms in light of the applicable legal standards, all varieties of
taxidermy mannequins seem to satisfy the originality requirement
of the Copyright Act. Further, arguments that the mannequins are
useful articles not entitled to copyright protection will probably not
succeed, as long as certain minority standards for determining
useful article cases do not rise to prominence. However, the merger
doctrine may deny protection to certain animal forms. For
example, forms which are not susceptible to a sufficient variety of
expression, such as the fish mannequins that were denied protec-
tion in Hart, will not receive protection because such an award
would be viewed as protection of an idea rather than expression.
If copyright protection is not afforded, however, other existing
intellectual property guarantees may apply.
II. ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF PROTECTION
Assuming that copyright protection for taxidermy forms is barred
either under one of the tests for conceptual separability of useful
8'Hart v. Dan Chase Taxidermy Supply Co., 86 F.3d 320,322,39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1310,
1312 (2d Cir. 1996).
SId.
The court found that:
[Tihe majority of the expressive details of the mounted fish depend on
the size and shape of the fishes' skull, the color and consistency of the
scales, and the fins and tail, none of which relate to the internal fish
mount. Thus, the only arguable expressive choices for the carvers that
are visibly manifested in any significant way in the finished fish is the
cant or "swish" of the tail.
Hart v. Dan Chase Taxidermy Supply Co., 967 F. Supp. 70, 72-73, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1214, 1217 (N.D.N.Y. 1997).
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articles or under the merger doctrine, the sculptors of these
mannequins may still be able to obtain protection for their
creations. The most likely form of such protection is a design
patent.
8 7
A design patent is one of three types of patents (the others being
utility and plant patents) available to creators or inventors. 8 The
issues that determine whether particular subject matter is
appropriate for a design patent are: "(1) whether the features
sought to be protected are ornamental, as opposed to merely
utilitarian or functional; and (2) whether those features are applied
to, or embodied in, an article of manufacture." 9
Before analyzing these requirements, however, it is useful to
examine the process by which patents are obtained from the United
States Patent and Trademark Office in order to determine whether
design patents are really a feasible alternative to copyright. The
creator who wishes to patent his creation must apply for a patent
through a process known as "patent office prosecution." ° If a
patent is granted, the patent represents "a contract between an
inventor and the United States government under which the
government grants the inventor a limited monopoly, ... [and in
return] the inventor discloses the complete invention to the public
in order to promote ... progress."91
The advantage of obtaining a patent over obtaining a copyright
87 35 U.S.C. § 171 (1994). Note that copyright and patent protection are not mutually
exclusive. A creator of an item may obtain simultaneous patent and copyright protection.
In re Yardley, 493 F.2d 1389, 1394, 181 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 331, 334-35 (C.C.P.A. 1974).
However, the judiciary has been reluctant to afford copyright protection to articles possessing
features rising to the level of industrial design. Mark A. LoBello, The Dichotomy Between
Artistic Expression and Industrial Design: To Protect or Not to Protect, 13 WHITTIER L. REV.
107, 110 (1992).
88 A utility patent is available for "any new and useful process, machine, manufacture,
or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof. . . ." 35 U.S.C. § 101
(1994). A design patent is available for "any new, original and ornamental design for an
article of manufacture. . . ." 35 U.S.C. § 171.
8 Lance L. Vietzke, Note, Software as the Article of Manufacture in Design Patents for
Icons, 21 AIPLA Q.J. 138, 140 (1993).
' An application must be submitted to the Patent and Trademark Office with the
appropriate fees for review by a Patent Examiner. Stephen A. Church, Note, The Weakening
of the Presumption of Validity for Design Patents: Continued Confusion under the
Functionality and Matter of Concern Doctrines, 30 IND. L. REV. 499, 502-03 (1997).
9
'
1 1d. (quoting RONALD B. HILDRETH, PATENT LAW: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE 30, 31 (2d
ed. 1993)).
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is the breadth of protection received. A patent grants an absolute
monopoly for a specified period of time, and once obtained it
prevents any form of copying. Design patents are "generally viewed
as providing stronger protection than copyrights for the same
features."92 To the contrary, under copyright law, a distinguish-
able variation to an existing work is enough to avoid infringement
liability.
Design patents present several disadvantages, however. In
addition to the greater expense which must be incurred to obtain
a patent, the requirements for obtaining the patent are also higher.
Namely, the creator seeking a design patent will be subject to the
more stringent requirements of novelty and nonobviousness.93 As
mentioned earlier, novelty is a concept distinct from the originality
requirement of copyright law.94 Novelty entails either an individ-
ual, newly developed feature or a combination of elements not
found in prior works.95 Thus, for an item to be novel, it must
have "[a] 'new and original' effect."96
While novelty is a fairly straightforward prerequisite of patent-
ability, the issue of nonobviousness is considerably more complex.
According to the statute governing design patents, a patent may
not be issued for an item based on an existing work "if the
differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and
the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would
have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person
having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter
pertains."97 Nonobviousness is distinct from novelty in that even
if a person creates something entirely new and unique, patent
protection will not be available if the creation would have been
92 Vietzke, supra note 89, at 144.
93 Id.
94 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 9.
' Bush Indus., Inc. v. O'Sullivan Indus., Inc., 772 F. Supp. 1442, 1452, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1561, 1568 (D. Del. 1991).
9' Valley Shoe Corp. v. Tober-Saifer Shoe Co., 25 F. Supp. 860, 861, 40 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
531,532 (E.D. Mo. 1938) (quoting Sodemann Heat & Power Co. v. Kauffman, 275 F. 593,597
(8th Cir. 1921)).
97 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1994); see also Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17, 148 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 459, 467 (1966) ("[Tlhe scope and content of the prior art are to be determined;
differences between the prior art and the claims at issue are to be ascertained; and the level
of ordinary skill in the pertinent art [must be] resolved.").
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obvious to another. While the meaning of nonobviousness is an
established principle of law, a split exists in the federal circuits
about how the nonobviousness standard should be applied.
The former Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (now the Court
of Federal Claims) posits the view that under the statute, it is only
necessary to "determine obviousness to the ordinary intelligent
man."98 Other circuits have disregarded this interpretation and
required that nonobviousness be measured from the perspective of
a designer having ordinary skill in the art.99 Lower courts have
had difficulty ascertaining a distinction between the practical effect
of the two standards, but the second approach seems to be favored
because it more closely approximates the actual language of the
patent statute. 100
The second approach also seems to be more strict, however, and
may bar patent protection in a greater number of cases. The
designs for which patent protection is sought are often fairly
complex. In those situations, the design will almost always be
nonobvious to a lay person. On the contrary, any obviousness will
be more readily apparent to one skilled in the relevant field
because such a person will have knowledge about matters such as
the feasibility of various designs. A broader standard such as that
used by the Court of Federal Claims and the Ninth Circuit may
better serve the goal of the design patent statute, which is to
encourage ornamental design.'0 '
As stated earlier, the primary issues in evaluating the availabili-
ty of design patent protection are whether the features sought to be
protected are ornamental, and whether they are embodied in an
article of manufacture. The article of manufacture requirement is
not controversial in most cases. An article of manufacture is
" Application of Laverne, 356 F.2d 1003, 1006, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 674, 677 (C.C.P.A.
1966). This test has also been adopted by the Ninth Circuit in Schwinn Bicycle Co. v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 444 F.2d 295, 168 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 258 (9th Cir. 1970).
'9 Sidewinder Marine, Inc. v. Starbuck Kustom Boats & Prods., Inc., 418 F. Supp. 224,
228, 193 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 777, 780 (D. Colo. 1976), affd, 597 F.2d 201, 202 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
356 (10th Cir. 1979).
10 Sidewinder Marine, Inc., 418 F. Supp. at 229 (comparing the language of the second
standard with that of 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1994)).
1'0 Application of Honeywell, Inc., 497 F.2d 1344, 1348, 181 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 821, 824
(C.C.P.A. 1974).
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simply "anything made by man from raw materials."' °2 In the
taxidermy cases, the article of manufacture requirement is
satisfied, because each mannequin is sculpted by an individual
using raw materials such as wood, clay and bone.
With respect to the ornamental requirement for design patents,
the courts have developed two standards that a design patent must
satisfy in order to be considered ornamental and hence valid: "(1)
the design must meet the doctrine of functionality requirements
and (2) the design must be a 'matter of concern.' "10
The functionality requirement is very similar to the conceptual
separability requirement for useful articles in the copyright context.
Because design patents are only issued for ornamental features, if
a design also contains functional elements, it will be patentable
only if it has an appearance -distinct from that dictated solely by
functional considerations. 104 Alternately stated, if the design is
primarily ornamental, even though it also serves a utilitarian
purpose, the requirement of ornamentation is met.'0 5 The pri-
marily ornamental standard serves the function of promoting the
decorative arts, one of the purposes of the patent statute,0 6 by
protecting those portions of an otherwise functional item which are
the product of the creator's artistic expression.
How does one determine, however, whether certain features of a
design are functional or ornamental? The design of a useful article
is deemed functional When "the appearance of the claimed design
is 'dictated by' the use or purpose of the article."' 7 If there are
several ways to achieve the same function, a presumption arises
that the design in the patent claim serves a primarily ornamental
10 Vietzke, supra note 89 (citing In re Hruby, 373 F.2d 997, 1000, 153 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
61, 65 (C.C.P.A. 1967)).
103 Church, supra note 90, at 506.
104 35 U.S.C. § 171 (1994). Note, however, that the issue of functionality must be raised
as an affirmative defense to a claim of infringement and must be proved by the party as-
serting the defense. L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thom McAn Shoe Co., 988 F.2d 1117, 1123, 25
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1913, 1917 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
106 Hupp v. Siroflex of America, Inc., 122 F.3d 1456, 1460, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1887,
1890 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Note that the inquiry into whether the design is primarily ornamental
is quite similar to the inquiry made by the court in Kieselstein-Cord, namely, whether the
functional aspects were subsidiary to the ornamental features. Kieselstein-Cord v.
Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989, 993, 208 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1, 3 (2d Cir. 1980).
10 Tyco Indus., Inc. v. Tiny Love, Ltd., 914 F. Supp. 1068, 1076 (D.N.J. 1996).
107 LA. Gear, Inc., 988 F.2d at 1123.
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purpose.0 8 The apparent logic behind this presumption is that
if a creator has a choice of ways to fulfill a function, his/her
decision must be based on a desire to express a certain ornamental
design.
An example of how the doctrine of functionality can invalidate a
design patent is G.B. Lewis Co. v. Gould Products Inc.109 That
case involved a rectangular open-topped plastic storage box with
the walls offset to facilitate stacking. The court held that there
was nothing in the box's design which was not dictated by "pure
functionality."" Based on the holding of the G.B. Lewis case, the
standard for separating function from ornamentation in the field of
design patents appears to be quite similar to that used for useful
articles in the copyright context, although the patent standard
seems to be more strict. In the copyright context, even if an item's
appearance was entirely or primarily dictated by functional
concerns, copyright protection could still be obtained if an ordinary
observer could conceptually separate the ornamental and utilitarian
features."' The patent test is more subjective, looking to the
motive behind the design. One case has simply held that whether
an item is primarily functional is a matter of "[clommon sense." "'
The second issue bearing on whether a design is sufficiently
ornamental to obtain a patent is the matter of concern doctrine.
The matter of concern doctrine is an attempt to define exactly when
the appearance of an article of manufacture is ornamental."'
The doctrine arose in In re Koehring, where the Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals phrased the inquiry: "Is the ornamentation...
a matter of concern to anybody, reasonably within the purview of
T yco Indus., Inc., 914 F. Supp. at 1077.
109 G.B. Lewis Co. v. Gould Prods., Inc., 297 F. Supp. 690, 160 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 311
(E.D.N.Y. 1968), affd, 436 F.2d 1176 (2d Cir. 1971). See also A & H Mfg. Co. v. Contempo
Card Co., 576 F. Supp. 894, 900, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 67, 71 (D.R.I. 1983) (holding that
competitor's adaptation of plastic display cards used to hold jewelry in retail stores was not
patentable, even though the prior versions were aesthetically unattractive, because the new
configuration was primarily a response to problems of usage and thus the design was
dictated by functional requirements).
0 G.B. Lewis Co., 297 F. Supp. at 695.
. See Part I.B.
112 Application of Carletti, 328 F.2d 1020, 1021, 140 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 653, 654 (C.C.P.A.
1964).
11 In re Koehring, 37 F.2d 421, 423, 4 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 169, 171 (C.C.P.A. 1930).
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the act?"" 4 The court stated the test in terms of "a matter of
concern to anybody" to broaden the definition of what is ornamen-
tal, rejecting the prior approach that the requisite ornamentation
for design patents was confined to the aesthetic or fine arts."'
An example of how the matter of concern doctrine operates is
Best Lock Corp. v. Ilco Unican Corp. 116 At issue in that case were
the design patents of blanks used to make keys. The court held
that the design of these blanks was entirely determined by the
need for lock control and maintenance of adequate security." 7
Moreover, the court found that the ornamental design of a key is
not a matter of concern for any consumer, thus the patent was
ruled invalid." 8 In other words, the ornamental features of a key
would not be a factor in any person's decision whether to purchase
that key.
In order for a design patent to be valid it must satisfy the
requirements of both the functionality and matter of concern
doctrines. Having established these bases for validity of a design
patent, the next issue to be discussed is the standards that exist for
determining infringement.
Infringement of a design patent is determined from the perspec-
tive of an ordinary observer, a standard introduced in Gorham Co.
v. White, a landmark Supreme Court case dealing with the alleged
infringement of a design patent for the handles of silverware." 9
The Court, applying this standard, held that an ordinary observer
would indeed believe that the alleged infringer's design was the
same as the patent holder's design, justifying a finding of infringe-
ment. 2 ° One author suggests the ordinary observer standard is
preferable because it allows market value to be added to an article
if manufacturers can use the appearance of a design to identify the
source of goods.' 2 ' In other words, a company can increase the
114 Id.
"5 Id. at 422.
116 Best Lock Corp. v. ilco Unican Corp., 896 F. Supp. 836, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1527
(S.D. Ind. 1995), affd, 94 F.3d 1563, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1048 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
17 Best Lock Corp., 896 F. Supp. at 843-44.
118 Id.
119 Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. 511, 530 (1871).
'20 Id. at 531.
121 In this sense, the protection is very much like that afforded by trademark law.
Vietzke, supra note 89, at 143.
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value of its product if it is given protection for a unique design that
can readily be identified by consumers.
The ordinary observer test has been refined somewhat by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. That court
has stated that "[f]or a design patent to be infringed,... no matter
how similar two items look, 'the accused device must appropriate
the novelty in the patented device which distinguishes it from the
prior art.' "122 This standard for infringement is called the point
of novelty approach. By formulating this approach, the Federal
Circuit was merely trying to clarify what the Supreme Court had
stated in Gorham by pointing out that "even though the court
compares two items through the eyes of the ordinary observer, it
must nevertheless, to find infringement, attribute their similarity
to . . . novelty." 2 ' The court in Litton Systems, Inc. v. Whirlpool
Corp. held that because the alleged infringer's microwave oven did
not possess certain features which made the patent-holder's oven
novel for the purposes of obtaining that patent, a finding of
infringement was inappropriate.'24
In a more recent case, however, the Federal Circuit has backed
away from the point of novelty approach, holding that it is not
really a distinctive standard for determining patent infringe-
ment.'25 The court stated that the determination of whether the
accused device appropriates the novelty of the patented device is
"irrelevant" and is a factor which would be considered anyway
under the objective observer standard of Gorham.'26 Thus, the
existence of the point of novelty approach as a standard distinct
from the Gorham test may be in danger of extinction.
Having examined the basic requirements for the availability of
patent protection and the standards for patent infringement, how
would the taxidermy mannequin cases come out if the sculptors
sought patent rather than copyright protection? In all likelihood,
12 Litton Sys., Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp., 728 F.2d 1423, 1444, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 97, 109
(Fed. Cir. 1984) (quoting Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Talge, 140 F.2d 395, 396, 60 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 434, 434-35 (8th Cir. 1944)).
123 Litton Sys., Inc., 728 F.2d at 1444.12
4 id.
12 Braun, Inc. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 975 F.2d 815, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1121 (Fed.
Cir. 1992).
1'2 Id. at 820 n.7.
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the outcome would be the same. Recall that for a patent to issue,
a design must be novel, meaning that it must contain elements of
both newness and originality. Because each mannequin contains
varied, distinct features with regard to muscle, skin and pose, the
novelty requirement can probably be overcome. Further, because
such discretion is exercised by the sculptor aside from functional
concerns, the mannequins would likely be classified as ornamental
for purposes of the patent statute. Finally, the aesthetic or design
features of the taxidermy forms would be a matter of concern for a
consumer, because appearance of the animal is the primary concern
for consumers.
The greatest challenge to obtaining a design patent for taxidermy
forms is the nonobviousness requirement. For a design to be
patentable, it must be one that at the time of its creation was not
obvious to a person with ordinary skill in the art. In the taxidermy
mannequin cases, then, the question would be whether the
particular design of a certain mannequin would be obvious to an
ordinary sculptor of such mannequins. For example, would a
sculptor of taxidermy forms find it obvious to create the form of a
deer with its limbs and head in a certain position and its muscles
flexed in a particular manner? The answer is not clear, and a court
could deny patent protection on these grounds.
While sculptors of taxidermy mannequins do exercise discretion
in choosing the form the animal will take, to a certain extent the
realm of possible positions is finite. Thus, any form could be
considered obvious. However, in any particular industry, the
bounds of discretion will be limited by such considerations as
feasibility and marketability. Because of this fact, courts should
apply the nonobviousness requirement with greater deference to
the patent-seeker. While the issue is certainly not conclusive,
sculptors of taxidermy mannequins can likely fulfill the nonobvious-
ness requirement and obtain patent protection for their designs.
CONCLUSION
Although the issues may be closer than some of the opinions
indicate, the cases dealing with the copyright protection of taxider-
my mannequins have probably been properly decided. Those
involved in the taxidermy industry must realize, however, that the
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legal standards regarding the ability to copyright taxidermy
mannequins are not truly settled. Different federal circuits apply
different tests, which could have a significant bearing on the
availability of protection. While the originality requirement can
likely be uniformly met by sculptors of taxidermy forms, the same
cannot be said with regard to the doctrines of useful articles and
merger.
Whether the mannequins are categorized as useful articles may
depend on whether they are subjected to an objective or subjective
standard of conceptual separability. Under the objective test, the
availability of copyright protection will depend on the ability of a
reasonable person to distinguish between art and utility. However,
this test itself contains an inherent degree of subjectivity, because
the opinion of the so-called reasonable person often amounts to no
more than the opinion of the court itself.
With regard to the merger doctrine, sculptors of taxidermy
mannequins will have to acknowledge the limitations that the
natural characteristics of animals place on them, and they may
have to exercise an even greater deal of creativity in order to
satisfy the substantial similarity test and avoid merger. This
proposition is especially true for certain types of animals such as
fish, where the available means of expression are necessarily more
limited than they are for other animals.
If copyright protection does prove to be unattainable, sculptors
may have to turn to alternate areas of intellectual property law to
protect their creations. The most likely form of such protection is
a design patent. Design patents apply to the ornamental qualities
of manufactured articles. Taxidermy mannequins can fulfill both
these requirements because they are manufactured from raw
materials and are designed with distinct consideration of ornamen-
tation rather than function. However, articles seeking design
patent protection also must be novel and nonobvious. While the
taxidermy mannequins can likely satisfy the novelty element, the
nonobviousness requirement may prove more difficult to fulfill
because of the finite number of choices a sculptor can make in
designing a mannequin based on a real animal.
The design patent may not be a feasible alternative, however, for
substantive reasons such as nonobviousness, and for practical
reasons such as the greater cost and bureaucratic procedure of the
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Patent and Trademark Office. Thus, copyright probably remains
the best form of protection for sculptors of taxidermy mannequins.
If so, sculptors should remain aware of the legal standards
governing the availability of protection for their creations and
should exercise as much creativity as possible in order to ensure
that the requirements of the Copyright Act and its interpretive case
law are fulfilled.
NATHAN C. ROGERS
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